Bill Clinton's "credibility"!
As you can all see from the previous post, I got rather "worked up" over Larry Sabato's sabotage of George Allen. This reminded me that I should also get worked up over Bill Clinton's latest attempt at self-justification during his interview with Chris Wallace on Fox News Sunday. Thus, I went back and "dug up" something I wrote in 2002. First a word of explanation:
From 2000 through 2003, I conducted a lengthy and lively correspondence with a personal friend who was at that time a senior-ranking diplomat in Washington from a European country. In the Fall of 2002, I was asked to comment upon the French language publication of a series of columns by the American author Robert Kagan. This was in the context of a debate my friend and I were having over the United States' declination to join the International Criminal Court. The exegesis below is an excerpt from a much longer disquisition on this general subject, that is very pointedly referential to the subject at hand.
I realize the document is prolix, some of the tangential references are now somewhat dated, and the specifics about Bill Clinton do not appear until approximately the second half; hence two points: (1) I felt it necessary to include the entire bit about the ICC to make the excerpt coherent within itself; and (2) the "dated" references do not, I believe, detract from the document's overall cogency. As for its prolixity, please do read through to the end. I promise you will not be disappointed. Please be sure also to read the foot notes. They are intrinsic to the text.
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (“ICC”)
Our discussion of the ICC began with Charles Krauthammer’s column on the Bush administration’s attempt to seek waivers of the ICC’s jurisdiction over American peacekeeping troops from Romania and Bulgaria. Herr Krauthammer essentially accused the EU, in the person of Romano Prodi, of issuing an ultimatum to potential EU members not to accede to the American request for waivers. I cannot, of course, comment on just how Prodi meant what he said. What is clear, however, is that many among potential EU members -- particularly the Baltics -- took Prodi’s comments as exactly that, an ultimatum.28 At the same time, certain EU members themselves have begun to warm up to bilateral waivers with the U.S. As might be expected, the U.K. sees “no fundamental incompatibility” between the ICC and such “bilateral accords”. The more interesting position, however, comes from P.M. Silvio Berlusconi, who is also his own Foreign Minister, and who said that each European country “can decide on its own on bilateral agreements”, adding that Italy was “inclined” to reach such an accord with the U.S.29
The “Right-Left” Divide and the ICC
I make this point, at the risk of belabouring it, because I think the difference between Prodi and Berlusconi illustrates perfectly the difference between the failed Left of the 1990's, which has now moved on to the EU, and the new Right which is now coming to power at the national level. In addition, the personal differences between Prodi and Berlusconi is also most instructive. Berlusconi is the quintessential self-made man. He started as a lounge singer on Italian cruise ships and is now the richest man in Italy. Even though he has a tendency to shoot from the hip, I like him because his comments are usually spot-on, and I perceive that he is a man who understands the need to be willing to pay the price for what he wishes to accomplish.
Prodi, on the other hand, though he is generally conceded to be a brilliant man, is almost a parody of the “dreamy” academic Left -- just the sort of person that has wreaked such havoc in American society since the 1960's. Indeed, prior to 1982, Prodi’s entire professional life, except for a two-month stint as Minister of Industry in 1979, had been spent in the groves of academe, as a professor of economics at Bologna and a visiting professor at Harvard. His doctorate is from the London School of Economics. One would be hard pressed to name a more representative trio of institutions on the academic Left.
Even in 1982, he didn’t jump into the hurley-burley and compromise of electoral politics, but was put in charge of that lumbering relic of the Facist era, the Institute for Industrial Reconstruction (IRI). He is generally conceded to have done a good job in turning round the finances of the IRI, but the real test of his leanings is how he came to power in 1996 and lost power in 1998. In May, 1996, a Prodi government was voted in, replacing Lamberto Dini and defeating Berlusconi, with the support of Massimo D’Alema, a virtual life-long Communist who had revamped the Party into the PDS (Democratic Party of the Left). D’Alema was more or less forced to support Prodi because he (D’Alema) was still too identified with the Communists to win election himself. By October of 1998, however, D’Alema had successfully “converted” his image and took over from Prodi as Prime Minister. So, the “brilliant” academic economist had allowed himself to be used as a stalking horse for a real Communist to pursue the Italian premiership. Unfortunately, Prodi did not simply return to academia but moved on to the EU where he could issue his “non-ultimatum ultimata”.
Bad Precedents for the ICC
Italian politics aside, however, and after giving the matter considerable thought, over the past several years, I must conclude that the ICC, as currently conceived, is a bad idea, which the United States is right to resist. I am fully aware, of course, that a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that I should declare the causes that impel me to that conclusion.
To begin, I know of no light with which to judge the future except that of the past. The only remotely relevant experiences the modern world has had with anything at all similar to the proposed ICC are the International War Crimes Tribunal in the Hague and the Nürnburg war crimes tribunal in the 1940's after World War II. Another somewhat instructive situation, I believe, is the case of Augusto Pinochet. Let’s begin with Pinochet.
Augusto Pinochet
Pinochet was arrested in a London hospital in October, 1998, while recovering from surgery on a herniated disk. He was charged by a Spanish magistrate, Baltasar Garzon, on grounds of murder, kidnaping, and torturing political opponents (who were also Spanish citizens) while he was in office in Chile from 1973-1990. Garzon’s arrest warrant was enforceable in the U.K. under the EU treaty. Ultimately, the Brits ducked the issue of Pinochet’s actual extradition to Spain for trial because British doctors found that the eighty-three year old general was too ill to stand trial.30
The ICC loudly trumpets the provision in its charter that a prosecution may go forward only when there has been no prosecution in the home state of the accused. Indeed, I see this as an invitation to mischief, and not as a “plus factor” in favour of the ICC. Chile itself had not only decided not to prosecute Pinochet but indeed considered him a national hero and made him a Senator for life when he voluntarily gave up power in 1990. Why should Chile not have the right of a sovereign nation to decide for itself who its heroes are and who its criminals are? Why should an international, leftist, politically correct, institution have the power to override the decision of a sovereign state about matters within its own borders?31
The case of Pinochet is again particularly instructive on yet another (and in my opinion more important) level. Pinochet, before the junta, was a professional soldier, and, while generally a man of conservative bent, was not known to profess any particular political ideology. Pinochet acted, purely and simply, to save Chile from Communism, at a time when the Soviet Union still loomed large as one of two superpowers. I concede that his methods were brutal, but I do not concede that they were not necessary or justified. Certainly the Chilean people came to view them as justified. In this regard, I would invite anyone who thinks Pinochet to be a criminal to pose a hypothetical question to the Poles: What methods do they think would have been justified to keep the Red Army out of Poland in 1944, or to get the Red Army out of Poland in 1945? If I know the Poles, they would think that Pinochet’s methods were, if anything, all too soft on the Communists.
The case of Pinochet lays bare the fecklessness and double standards of the Euro Left as described by Kagan. They are happy today to have Chile as a stable, peaceful, and economically successful democracy among the community of nations. At the same time, however, they want to punish the man who paid the price to make it so. If an Allende were to arise in my home, I would gladly join a Pinochet to thwart him.32 I have come to see the ICC as the Euro Left’s attempt to establish an international leftist political order through the “back door”. This is yet again an example of the Left’s wanting something, but not being willing to pay the price to achieve that something. At least the Bolsheviks bought Russia with their own blood, and the Soviets bought their empire with their own blood.
Nürnberg
This brings us to Nürnberg. Virtually everyone agrees that the war crimes prosecutions there were thoroughly justified. What the modern Left overlooks, however, is that the right to establish the Nürnberg tribunal was bought and paid for in the deadliest war in human history. I know that at least lip service must be paid to the notion that war should be eliminated from human affairs. I must tell you, however, that, in this context, the ICC smacks all too much of being one more instance in which the Euro Left wants to have something for which it is not willing to pay the price. This point will come up again with respect to the current Hague tribunal.
Over the years, I worked closely on several projects with a man named Fred Rodell who was an administrative officer and interrogator at Nürnberg.33 Fred gave me an interesting perspective on the whole process. Fred’s view was that the Russians were simply about to execute the Nazi leaders in a very public and very grizzly manner. Certainly this would have been consistent with the “Red Storm on the Reich”. One is reminded of the perhaps apocryphal British P.O.W. who was liberated by the Red Army from a Stalag near Auschwitz, and was reported to have exclaimed: “My God! I’ll forgive the Russians absolutely anything they do to this country ... Absolutely anything.” The Western Allies pressed for the trials so as to put a patina of “justice” and “due process” on what the Russians were about to do anyway. My feeling is that, had the Russians simply done the deed, the “Western” Left would not have been nearly as apoplectic as they were over Pinochet. Rather, they would have fallen all over themselves to “justify” the magnificent “justice” meted out by the “glorious” Soviet Union. On the other hand, Mother Russia had gotten to Nürnberg at the cost of twenty to fifty million dead.34
Waging Aggressive War
Before we move on to the International War Crimes Tribunal at the Hague, there is one last point to be made about the Nürnberg trials, which, in my view, has a direct bearing on the performance of the Hague Tribunal, though this may not be apparent at first.
Today, we tend to remember only the most sensational crimes of the Nazis: die Endlösung der judischer Frage, the gas ovens at Auschwitz, etc. What virtually everyone forgets, however, is that the basic charge at Nürnberg was “waging aggressive war”. This was the charge that was used to justify the tribunal in the first place. All the other charges, from mass murder to genocide, were essentially tacked on to the basic charge of waging aggressive war. One of the specifications of this charge, as against Hermann Göring and other Lüftwaffe leaders, was the two-week bombing campaign against Belgrade in 1941. This campaign was considered to be a “war crime” because Belgrade was essentially defenseless in that it had no anti-aircraft artillery. The Lüftwaffe leaders knew this and nevertheless pummeled the city for two weeks. My purpose here is neither to condemn the campaign nor to compare it to the Allied firebombing of Dresden.35 This charge should, however, be borne in mind as one considers the performance of the Hague tribunal.
The Hague Tribunal
The establishment of a permanent international tribunal to prosecute “crimes against humanity” cannot be said to be a bad idea per se. The Hague tribunal, however, has shown this to be a bad idea in the present international political (politically correct) climate. I can offer no overall assessment on the Hague prosecutions, but, in its most high-profile single case, the prosecution of Slobodan Milosevic, the tribunal has shown itself to be little more than an instrument of the Left, the very same self-absorbed and precious left that Mr. Kagan describes. I say this regardless of whether the tribunal ultimately convicts (very likely) or acquits (very unlikely) Milosevic.
Let me hasten to add that I hold no brief for Milosevic. I have little doubt that, in a moral sense, he is an abomination, and almost certainly guilty of all the things he is accused of. In his prosecution, however, he has been singled out as a scapegoat for the failures of the feckless left in its policies in the late 1990's with respect to the wars of Yugoslavia’s destruction. Worse, the essential effect of the Milosevic prosecution has been to draw attention away from, with the effect, intended or not, of covering up, other very real war crimes committed by the Left. These “other” war crimes were committed by the Left when it was in power at the national level in the 1990's. They are easily discernable if one is not blinded by the hue and cry over Milosevic and the Bosnian Serbs. The perpetrators include many of the same people discussed earlier who have now moved on the EU. These people, however, were followers. The real culprits this time round were American: Bill Clinton and Madeleine Albright.
The Left’s War Crimes
1. Bombing a sovereign state with no international sanction and no declaration of war
I fully realize that such a counter-intuitive charge demands detailed specification, which I am fully prepared to give. First, please allow me to set the stage with an anecdote.
On 29 April 1999, during the NATO bombing campaign in Yugoslavia/Serbia, French Ambassador François Bujon de L’Estang spoke at the Plimsol Club in New Orleans on “France, Europe, and Transatlantic Relations”. Bujon’s talk can be taken on one level as something of a counterpoint to Mr. Kagan’s description of “Europe”. In his prepared text, he used the then-ongoing NATO bombing of Yugoslavia/Serbia to all but flatly state that Europe was capable of being, and intended to be, a military partner with the United States. He said:
Kosovo further demonstrates [that] Europeans can act when it is necessary, and take their fair share of the burden with the United States, sharing the same goals. The impressive display of unity in purpose and resolve by the allies at the Washington NATO summit, should dispel for good the expressions of skepticism towards European ambitions.
The real reason I bring up the Bujon talk, however, is something that occurred in the question and answer period following the Ambassador’s prepared remarks.36 I asked him point blank what the justification was for the bombing of Yugoslavia/Serbia, given the following facts:
1. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) was universally recognized as a sovereign state, and it was the stated policy of the U.N., the EU, and the U.S. that Kosovo was and should remain a part of that sovereign state.
2. There had been no U.N. Security Counsel Resolution approving the bombing campaign.
3. There had been no authorization for the bombing by the EU.
4. There had been no declaration of war by the United States or any European power participating in the bombing.
5. The bombing by NATO forces was clearly beyond the scope of Article 5 of the NATO Charter because there had been no attack on any NATO member state.
Bujon’s response was most instructive on several levels. First, he more or less freely admitted that I was correct in my proposition, from a “technical legal” point of view, that the bombing of Yugoslavia/Serbia was illegal under international law, but he said that this matter should not be viewed as a “legal matter”. He went on to say, moving to yet another level, that “we” in Europe remained so “horrified” by the crimes of the Nazis that “we” were determined that “it” would never happen again. I was so completely stunned by the tenor of this response that I was rendered speechless (for one of the few times in my life) and simply sat down without attempting to probe his response.37
So, the French ambassador admits that the bombing is illegal under international law but justifies it because “we” think it is necessary.38 This attitude is doubly infuriating because it is so typical of the Left. “We” can do anything “we” want, violate any law, traduce any norm of morality, because “we” are gloriously liberal and thus can do no wrong. I have reviled this attitude from the student left of the 1960's to the Clinton administration. A version of this attitude is, as noted, exhibited in the Kagan columns when he presents the liberal position as the norm. This Left/liberal tendency -- together with its utter cravenness -- is at the very heart of the bombing of Yugoslavia/Serbia as well as my objection to the ICC as it is presently conceived. Now that we have established that the NATO bombing was itself a “war crime”, i.e., lethal military action conducted against a sovereign state without a declaration of war and with no international sanction, let us consider further specifications of the charge.39
2. The bombing of Civilians to coerce a diplomatic agreement
After a series of meetings in January-February, 1999, the soi–disant “contact group” of foreign ministers adopted, on 23 February, at Rambouillet, the “Interim Agreement for Peace and Self Government in Kosovo”. This “agreement” was to take effect upon the signatures of representatives of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Republic of Serbia, and “Kosovo”, and was to be witnessed by the European Union, the Russian Federation, and the United States. Madeleine Albright publicly took great credit for the Rambouillet “agreement” and went to Paris on 15 March, amid great fanfare, for a “signing ceremony”, assuming that Slobodan Milosevic could be bullied into signing on behalf of Yugoslavia and Serbia, thus effectuating the Agreement. Milosevic refused to sign and the talks were suspended. The NATO bombing of Serbia began on 24 March 1999.40
During the bombing campaign, which lasted until 3 June, it soon became clear that Serbian civilians were being killed by NATO bombs. This was, of course, passed off as “collateral damage”. It soon became obvious that this was not an accurate characterization, not only because large numbers of civilians were being hit, but also because the NATO planes were attacking civilian targets. The most well-publicized example of this was the principal television transmitter in Belgrade. There was a mini-drama played out on CNN for several nights when NATO planes would take out the transmitter, the Serbs would scramble around to get it back on the air, and NATO planes would take it out again.41 The justification given for targeting the transmitter was that Milosevic was using Serb television to put out “propaganda” to rally the Serb people against the NATO campaign.
In my judgment this was patently ridiculous, if not to say outrageous. What was happening was clear to anyone who was willing to be skeptical toward the “Western” propaganda campaign. The United States in the person of Madeleine Albright had been embarrassed by the failure to bully Milosevic into signing the Rambouillet agreement. As a result the U.S. essentially ordered NATO to conduct a bombing campaign -- with no declaration of war or U.N. sanction -- that the leaders knew would claim a large number of civilian casualties and in which civilian facilities were targeted upon the flimsiest of pretexts. These leaders were essentially the same Leftist crew that would react so outrageously toward Joerg Haider later that same year. The bombing of civilians to coerce a diplomatic agreement is one of the absolutely classic specifications of a charge of war crimes. Indeed, Article II of the U.N. charter, the very document that the EU Left is now whining about with respect to Iraq, expressly forbids:
... the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.42
In my judgment, both Bill Clinton and Madeleine Albright should be facing this charge right now alongside Milosevic. Indeed, there is a further specification of the charge of war crimes that can be made out from nothing more than press accounts.
3. Bombing civilian populations that have no air defenses
The central fact about Bill Clinton is that he is a coward, in every sense of the word -- a moral coward, a physical coward, and a political coward. In 1999, his political cowardice led to yet another war crime in Kosovo. Bill Clinton’s fear of the political consequences to him of American casualties in Kosovo led him to order the Navy and Air Force pilots to act as though they were cowards, and in the process to commit yet a different version of a war crime. One particularly egregious example will make this point.
During the bombing campaign, it was widely reported that NATO planes, particularly American planes, were flying their bombing raids at altitudes too high for the old-fashioned Serb air-defense artillery to reach. One specific story in The New York Times told the tale in a particularly revealing way. It reported bombing raids over Belgrade -- the same raids that were targeting the civilian television tower and which bombed the Chinese embassy -- which were bombing civilian areas of the city with essential impunity from air-defense radar. American, British, and French commanders admitted to Times reporters that they could do their jobs more effectively and with less risk of civilian casualties if they flew at much lower altitudes. They had been ordered by the highest command authority to fly at the higher altitudes, however, because flying at the lower altitudes would have increased the risk of being shot down. It was clear that the commanders considered raids at the lower altitude to be an acceptable military risk, together with its concomitant benefit of greater military efficiency, but that they had been ordered to fly at the higher altitudes to avoid the political risk.43
In my judgment, the 1999 NATO/American raids over Belgrade, from a height that could not be reached by Serb air-defense radar, were no different in character from the 1941 Lüftwaffe raids over the same Belgrade that had no air-defense artillery: They were both war crimes.44 So, we have two distinct and cognizable specifications of a charge of war crimes in what was essentially the Left’s attempt to conduct a war: (1) bombing of civilians to coerce a diplomatic agreement; and (2) bombing of a civilian city with no effective air-defense artillery. When this is coupled with the litany I recited to Bujon reflecting no basis for the action in international law, the whole episode should be viewed as a disgrace.45 More pointedly, Slobodan Milosevic, and his fellow Serb co-defendants, should not be the only chef d’etat, or high government officials, on trial in the Hague.
Once again, I must emphasize that I hold no brief for Milosevic. Certainly, tu quoque, is not, and should not be, a defense to any criminal charge or specification. What I have recited about the Kosovo bombing should, however, inform any judgment on the performance of the Hague tribunal as well as any assessment of the likely performance of the ICC. It is clear to me that Milosevic is a kind of “scapegoat of opportunity”, if you will, for the failed policy of the Left, in power in the mid to late 1990's, in reacting to the wars of Yugoslavia’s destruction.
The Dayton Accords
It is not only the 1999 bombing that the Left is trying to take the focus away from, but also the soi-disant “Dayton Accords” where the West essentially papered over many of the things, such as “genocide” between 1992 and 1995, with which Milosevic is now charged as war crimes. Milosevic, in 1995, was the only man on the planet who could end the Bosnian war and save the West from having to confront its own failures in Bosnia and Yugoslavia. Had they not “recognized” Milosevic as a bargaining partner, the West would have been faced with at least several unpalatable alternatives: (1) watch a Serbian victory in Bosnia; (2) mount a full scale military invasion to prevent it; (3) watch the Russians intervene on behalf of the Serbs; and/or (4) watch Iran intervene on behalf of the Bosnian Muslims.46
Indeed, I have no doubt that the instigators of the 1999 bombing, from Clinton and Albright to Tony Blair to Javier Solana to Massimo d’Alema, would be absolutely aghast and indignant at even the thought that they should be charged with war crimes. After all, they are liberal, their heart is in the right place, and they can do no wrong. Indeed, however, it is this very sort of moral obtuseness, a primary characteristic of the Left, that is at the heart of the problem I have with the ICC.
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28
Just as I would condemn any sort of ultimatum from Prodi, so would I also condemn the sort of quasi ultimatum that certain members of the U.S Congress are trying pose to the Baltics, i.e., that if any particular state does not accede to the American request for a waiver, then, these members of congress will “remember” that stance when they vote to ratify that state’s membership in NATO. This is a real whipsaw for the Baltics in particular, and I sympathize with them. I would also condemn what was clearly an ultimatum by the EU to Slovakia, stating in no uncertain terms that Slovakia “would not be allowed” to join the EU if the party of Vladimir Meciar was included in a governing coalition. Well, I happen to find Meciar odious, but his party did get the largest number of votes in the election. Fortunately for all concerned, the Slovak vote was so fragmented that Meciar’s party still got only 17%, and no other party will join them in a coalition. So, Meciar will be shut out of the government, and the EU has dodged the bullet it fired at itself. The precedent of Prodi ultimata, however, is undeniably there.
29
As might also be expected Joschka Fischer is absolutely opposed to bilateral agreements and absolutely rejects any military action against Iraq.
30
The U.S. has candidly admitted that what it truly fears about the ICC are cases like Pinochet, and not merely prosecutions of peacekeeping troops. The most immediate fear is Henry Kissinger. Dr. Kissinger should indeed fear something like what happened to Pinochet because the Left has loudly accused him of complicity with Pinochet in Pinochet’s alleged crimes in Chile in the 1970's -- particularly in the overthrow and death of Salvador Allende in 1973, when “der Heini” was Nixon’s National Security Advisor.
31
It should be pointed out that, in the case of Pinochet, he was, and is, generally seen as a hero by the Chilean people. It was not the case that he was simply being protected by a “rogue” dictatorial government.
32
Allow me to emphasize that I speak of real Soviet-style Communism, not merely a government of the Left. If a government of the Left is elected in a stable democracy, like Bill Clinton in the U.S. or the Labourites in the U.K., one simply has to live with them. Indeed, Tony Blair is hard upon demonstrating that even the Left can have principles and real spine.
33
Fred was a German Jew from Nürnberg. He left Germany in the mid 1930's, came to the U.S., enlisted in the army, and became a German translator for one of George Patton’s division commanders. In this role Fred actually met and knew slightly my father’s brother, who was also a German translator under General Patch, another of Patton’s division commanders. Fred’s great moment came when he was hired by the OSS and later served as an interrogator at Nürnberg. Fred was credited with being the man who broke the silence of Hermann Göring. Since you speak Italian, I will send you a copy of an article Fred gave me entitled: “Io, l’ebreo che piegò Goering ...”
34
The Soviets always claimed the number was fifty million. Originally, western historians pooh-poohed this figure and put the number at “approximately” twenty million. Over the years, as more and more information became available about the Russian war, the number began to creep up to “approximately” thirty million. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, with the concomitant greater access to the Soviet archives, some western historians are beginning to admit that the correct number may very well be closer to fifty million.
35
My grandfather always told me that our family had casualties on both sides of the Dresden raid. My father’s youngest brother, was a navigator-bombardier on a B-17 that was shot down during the raid. My grandfather also professed to have “cousins” living in Dresden though I never actually knew who they were. At the same time, I have always found Air Vice-Marshal Sir Arthur “Bomber” Harris, GCB, head of RAF Bomber Command, to be a figure worthy of admiration, despite the Dresden raid. I was very pleased some years ago when the Queen Mother unveiled the Bomber’s stature on The Strand over the apoplectic protests of the Left.
36
The official text of Bujon’s talk is available on the Internet. I have printed it out and enclose it herewith. The question and answer period is not included with the printed text, but is included on the official video of the event.
37
Bujon himself is no gauchiste. He is an aristocrat and a Gaullist; he was appointed ambassador to the U.S. by Jacques Chirac, and he began his public career as a aide to Le Grand Charles. Moreover, his answer was delivered so fluently that I have no doubt he had anticipated some sort of question on the NATO bombing and had worked out the general outlines of an answer in advance with the Quai d’Orsay. On the other hand, his answer was given slightly less that two years into the Gaullist cohabitation with Jospin. Thus, though I don’t really know where it came from, I tend to chalk off Bujon’s statement to the same sort of political cowardice that Chirac himself exhibited during this period.
38
I shall resist here the temptation to comment, other than in passing, on the continued obsession with Adolf Hitler. It sometimes seems as though the modern world cannot think of anything except within a frame of reference defined by Adolf Hitler. During the Gulf war of 1990-1991, for example, George Bush (41) apparently didn’t think he could make the case that Saddam Hussein was a malefactor except by casting hum as a “modern day Hitler”. I frequently have the disturbing thought that Hitler himself sits somewhere today taunting the world he made by saying: “Hate me if you will, but you will never forget me!” The invocation of the Nazi memory by Bujon in the context of the Kosovo bombing is, as we shall see, rather ironic.
39
It should be emphasized once again that my brief here is against the American ringleaders Bill Clinton and Madeleine Albright. To be sure, certain European political leaders were guilty as well, but that is beyond my present scope. It should not be forgotten, however, that these leaders are, in the main, the same ones that Kagan describes as “rejecting war” in favor of “perpetual peace”.
40
I shall refrain from making any comment on whether it was wise in the first instance to give “autonomy” to the KLA controlled Muslim province of Kosovo, and focus solely on the means of coercing Serbian acquiescence.
41
NATO planes also targeted the Belgrade police academy, bridges across the Danube into Hungary, various industrial plants, several political headquarters, a villa where Milosevic was staying, and civilian businesses that were owned and operated by Milosevic political allies, to say nothing of the “mistaken” targeting of the Chinese embassy.
42
I seem to remember that the old British Left Winger Tony Benn was a vocal supporter of the bombing in Yugoslavia. Now he has been quoted as saying that waging war in Iraq would amount to “tearing up” the U.N. Charter. The shoe never fits when one tries to put it on the other foot.
43
A French officer put it this way: “Military pilots are paid to risk their lives, and most of us feel frustrated a lot of the time. But the United States has a zero-deaths policy, and the United States is running the show.” He could more accurately have said: “Bill Clinton is a political coward, and he is running the show.”
44
During the course of the bombing, NATO lost only two planes, and no pilots, in over 33,000 missions. The utter enormity of this statistic alone is virtually enough by itself to establish that NATO pummeled an essentially defenseless enemy. Indeed, perhaps the greatest irony is that all this military might did not accomplish the short-run goal of “saving” the Kosovars from the “brutality” of the Serbs. There were well over ten times as many Kosovars either killed or rendered homeless during the six-week bombing campaign as there had been in the two years prior to the bombing.
45
Certainly there is no need to belabour the distinction between Bill Clinton and Madeleine Albright with respect to Kosovo and George Bush and Colin Powell with respect to Iraq. Bush and Powell are seeking both U.N. and Congressional sanction for their proposed action against Iraq. Moreover, at the recent NATO meeting in Warsaw -- the first ever on the soil of a former Warsaw Pact country -- Defense Secretary Don Rumsfeld let it be known pointedly that Washington would not want a war in Iraq to be a NATO mission like the bombing in Yugoslavia.
46
I take note that, in elections, in early October, all three “parts” of Bosnia returned to power the same “nationalist” parties that fomented the Bosnian war between 1992 and 1995, and this despite the “urging” of both the U.S. and the EU not to vote in this way. During the War, Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadzic said: “The Emperor Caligula put his horse in the Roman Senate. That horse was more a Senator that Bosnia has ever been a state.” This may have been the only thing that Dr. Karadzic got right.